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ARTICLES
OBSCENITY AND FILM:
AN EMPIRICAL DILEMMA*
By JefL Richards **
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to
the law to constitute themselves finaljudges of the worth ofpicto-
rial illustrations.'
-- Oliver Wendell Holmes
In just over three hundred years2 the legal concept of "obscenity"
has progressed, or regressed, to the point that a Supreme Court Justice
can precisely define it by the simple statement, "I know it when I see it."3
The severe problems inherent in defining a concept so abstract and dy-
namic as obscenity have recurringly resulted in modifying the legal stan-
dards concomitantly with public opinion, to the point that the courts are
now required to consider public opinion before rendering an opinion in
an obscenity case.4 As a result, a comment made by a legal scholar in
* This article was presented at the National Conference for Education in Journalism and
Mass Communications, August 3-6, 1985.
** The author is currently a doctoral candidate in Mass Communications at the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin-Madison, and holds a bachelor of science degree in photography from the
Rochester Institute of Technology (1977), as well as a juris doctor from Indiana University-
Bloomington (1981). He is licensed to practice law in the states of Indiana and Colorado.
1. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). The case in-
volved the question of allowing a copyright on pictures used as advertisements. While not
pertaining explicitly to obscenity, the statement is relevant to this subject matter, though the
judiciary has never acknowledged this position when approaching a question of first amend-
ment protection for visual erotica.
2. Le Roy v. Sr. Charles Sidney, 1 Sid. 168, pl. 29 (K.B. 1663); also reported as Sir
Charles Sydlyes' case, 1 Keble 620, 83 Eng. Rep. 1146 (1663). This, the first known case of
obscene conduct, involved the arrest of Sir Charles Sidney for having appeared on a balcony in
London unclad and intoxicated, from whence he hurled bottles of "offensive liquor" on pass-
ers-by. The concept of obscene literature was not recognized by the courts until 1727, in Dom-
inus Rex v. Curl, 2 Strange 788, 93 Eng. Rep. 849 (1727).
3. This oft-quoted statement appears in the concurring opinion of Justice Stewart in
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964).
4. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957), and Miller v. California. 413 U.S. 15,
33-34 (1973), require "applying contemporary community standards." See also Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964); United States v. Klaw, 350 F.2d 155, 164 (2d Cir. 1965):
Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 157 (1974); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115. 121 (1973).
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1938 still adheres: "There is no unity in describing what is obscene litera-
ture, or in prosecuting it. There is little more than the ability to smell
it."5 Given this obscurity of approach to regulation, it seems unlikely
that all varieties of communication are equally subject to censorship.
Pornography is available in a myriad of packages, including poetry,6
books,7 movies,8 plays9 and even phonograph records.'" Though the first
amendment stands like Cerberus guarding the gates of free speech, each
of these forms is subject to censure. It appears probable, however, that
since each capitalizes on a different medium of idea exchange, its impact
on a listener or viewer may very well be unique." These differences have
little bearing on whether or not any one particular form is chosen as a
vehicle for political, philosophical, or some other valuable and constitu-
tionally protected form of speech in any given instance, and each is there-
fore equally deserving of the protections afforded the others.' 2 The
primary questions addressed are 1) is there a different standard for visual
communications vis-a-vis verbal communications 3 and 2) if so, what
steps can be taken to remedy the inequities which may result from these
differing standards? In order to answer these questions we must first
consider the background of regulatory efforts directed at pornographic
materials.
5. Alpert, Judicial Censorship of Obscene Literature, 52 HARV. L. REV. 40, 47 (1938).
6. Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229 (1972).
7. A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney Gen.,
383 U.S. 413 (1966).
8. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
9. P.B.I.C., Inc. v. Byrne, 313 F. Supp. 757 (D. Mass.), stay denied, 398 U.S. 916 (1970).
10. United States v. Alpers, 338 U.S. 680 (1950).
11. For an overview of how the varying senses receive signals from stimuli outside the
human physiological system, see H.S. BARTLEY, PERCEPTION IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1972). A
large body of literature discusses how the several senses process information, but the magni-
tude and complexity of this topic puts it outside the realm of this article.
12. It should be noted that even "actions" can constitute protected "speech," such as sit-
ins or wearing black armbands in a protest. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931); Brown v.
Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); Smith v.
Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974)..
13. The present discussion, for the sake of brevity, has been confined to movies and books
as representatives of the visual and verbal classes of communications. These were chosen, in
part, because more litigation and explicit commentary has arisen in these contexts. Statements
in those cases and quoted herein, however, might be argued in the instance of still pictures as
well as their moving counterparts, with the exception that still photographs lack the added
dimensions of sound and motion. Live theater could certainly be equated to film. Another
example deals with indecency standards under the jurisdiction of the Federal Communications
Commission. See Rouder, If You Can't Say It, Why Can You Show It? An Open Letter to the
FCC, 9 GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 617 (1978-79).
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OBSCENITY: AN EXCEPTION TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The first amendment of the United States Constitution states with-
out qualification that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press. . . ." This absolute statement of ex-
pressive freedom is subject to several exceptions. Libelous speech,'
4
"fighting words,"' 5 subversive speech, 16 deceptive advertising, 7 and lim-
itations on where, when, and how speech is conducted in public places' 8
are all types of expression that courts have decided the framers of the
Constitution did not mean to be protected by their unlimited phraseol-
ogy. So, too, obscenity has been etched away from the face of the Bill of
Rights.
One of the first major obscenity cases to work its way to the
Supreme Court was Doubleday & Co. v. New York' 9 in 1948. In
Doubleday, a complaint was filed by the New York Society for the
Supression of Vice, claiming that the novel Memoirs of Hecate County,
by literary critic Edmund Wilson, was obscene. The publisher,
Doubleday, was consequently charged with a violation of the state's
criminal obscenity statute. Two descriptions of sexual intercourse in the
book were held by the lower court to be a violation of the statute. The
Supreme Court affirmed without rendering an express opinion about ob-
scenity per se. While this affirmation gave credence to the "obscenity
exception" to the first amendment, it provided no guidance in the matter.
Dicta in Beauharnis v. Illinois2 ° alluded to an opinion by the
Supreme Court that obscene materials will find no refuge under the first
amendment. This same view was reflected in Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
14. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
15. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15 (1971); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973).
16. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616 (1919); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
17. See, e.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942); Breard v. City of Alexandria,
341 U.S. 622 (1951); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council.
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
18. See, e.g., Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967); Lovell v. City of Griffin.
303 U.S. 444 (1938).
19. 335 U.S. 848 (1948). This affirmed People v. Doubleday & Co.. 272 A.D. 799, 71
N.Y.S.2d 736 (1947), a/I'd 297 N.Y. 687, 77 N.E.2d 6 (1947).
20. 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952). "Libelous utterances not being within the area of constitu-
tionally protected speech, it is unnecessary, either for us or for the State courts, to consider the
issues behind the phrase 'clear and present danger.' Certainly no one would contend that ob-
scene speech, for example, may be punished only upon a showing of such circumstances."
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speech, the prevention and punishment of which has never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the
lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
"fighting" words - those which by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.21
Roth v. United States2" finally shed some light on this issue in 1957.
Roth involved a defendant who conducted a business in New York pub-
lishing and selling books, photographs, and magazines. To advertise his
wares he used circulars and other advertising materials. He was con-
victed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York under the federal obscenity statute. The charges included
mailing obscene advertisements and an obscene book. Justice Brennan
confronted the problem explicitly:
The dispositive question is whether obscenity is utterance
within the area of protected speech and press. Although this is
the first time the question has been squarely presented to this
Court, either under the First Amendment or under the Four-
teenth Amendment, expressions found in numerous opinions
indicate that this Court has always assumed that obscenity is
not protected by the freedoms of speech and press.
23
Upon holding obscenity to be outside the umbrella of protected
speech, he further explained:
All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance
- unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to
the prevailing climate of opinion - have the full protection of
the guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon
the limited area of more important interests.
24
The theme that obscenity is utterly without redeeming social impor-
tance is echoed throughout the decision. Of significance, however, is the
fact that sex and obscenity are distinguished as not being synonymous.25
The final standard elucidated by the Court was 1) whether, to the
average person, 2) applying contemporary community standards, 3) the
dominant theme, 4) taken as a whole, 5) appeals to the prurient inter-
21. 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (emphasis added). See generally, Winters v. New York.
333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948); Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497, 508 (1904); Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931); United States v. Chase, 135 U.S. 255. 261 (1890).
22. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
23. Id. at 481.
24. Id. at 484 (emphasis added).
25. Id. at 487.
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est.2 6 The "dominant theme" was further suggested to mean that the
communication has, for example, no serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific merit." This standard stood after Roth for the next several
years.
In 1966, a subtle metamorphosis occurred in Memoirs v. Massachu-
setts, 28 which had the effect of posing a major blockade to prosecutors in
proving obscenity. The Supreme Court faced the question of whether a
book commonly known as Fanny Hill, by John Cleland (circa 1750),
could be banned. The book had been declared obscene by the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court. In overturning that decision, the United
States Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Brennan, an-
nounced that each of the three major elements of Roth had to be satisfied
independently.29 Under this new formulation, a work could not be ad-
judged obscene if it could pass any one of these elements. The Court's
opinion also announced a further qualification, that the matter must be
"utterly" without redeeming social value.3" Though this term had been
used by the Court in Roth, it was stated there as a basis for rejecting
protection for such speech under the first amendment, rather than as an
element of proof.3 In the Memoirs case, Fanny Hill was found to have
only a modicum of literary value according to the lower court, but that
was enough to save it from the jaws of censorship, since it was not "ut-
terly" without value.32 These changes altered the emphasis of the Roth
test (now the Roth-Memoirs test). This was a major, though short-lived,
victory for proponents of deregulation. It forced those attempting to
prosecute alleged obscene speech or actions to prove a negative - that
the challenged communication had no social value.33
26. Id. at 489.
27. Id. at 487. "The portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature and scientific works, is not
itself sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and
press." The term "political" is also included when interpreting Roth because several references
are made to the value of free speech in countering governmental efforts to invade the public's
liberties.
28. A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney Gen.,
383 U.S. 413 (1966).
29. Id. at 418. The three elements stated by the Court are (a) the dominant theme of the
material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex, (b) the material is patently
offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the description or
representation of sexual matters, and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value.
30. Id. at 419-20.
31. Roth, 354 U.S. at 484.
32. Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 420.
33. "While Roth presumed 'obscenity' to be 'utterly without redeeming social importance.,
Memoirs required that to prove obscenity it must be affirmatively established that the material
is 'utterly without redeeming social value.' Thus, even as they repeated the words of Roth. the
Memoirs plurality produced a drastically altered test that called on the prosecution to prove a
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Finally, in Miller v. California,34 the Court abandoned Memoirs and,
to some extent, reaffirmed Roth. The petitioner in Miller was convicted
for mailing to a restaurant in Newport Beach, California, five brochures
which advertised four books with sexually explicit pictures and drawings.
In rejecting Memoirs, the Court again enumerated specific considerations
to be applied in measuring the constitutional protection afforded any
given work:
a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest;
b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offen-
sive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable
state law; and
c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.35
In addition, the Court offered some new guidelines by giving "a few
plain examples of what a state statute could define for regulation":
a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate
sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated.
b) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of mastur-
bation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibitions of the
genitals.36
With this decision, the Court abolished the "utterly without socially
redeeming value" standard in favor of the standard given as an example
in Roth, that the communication lacks "serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value." This represented a swing back toward Roth, and at
the same time it completely obviated the advantage Memoirs had signi-
fied to those promoting obscenity-as-free-speech. Challenged speech
could no longer be saved by a mere modicum of value; it had to be of
"serious" value. Similarly, the list of "literary, artistic, political, or scien-
tific value" was now inclusive rather than representative, and "social
value" could arguably encompass varieties of speech no longer included
by the Miller definition.
This represents the current state of "obscenity" regulation, but this
brief overview of the history of obscenity has overlooked the earlier de-
velopment of motion picture censorship. Long before Roth, the United
negative, i.e., that the material was 'utterly without redeeming social value' - a burden virtu-
ally impossible to discharge under our criminal standards of proof." Miller, 413 U.S. at 21-22.
34. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
35. Id. at 24.
36. Id. at 25.
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States Supreme Court upheld the censorship of motion pictures.37
MOVIE CENSORSHIP
The power and influence of motion pictures as tools or weapons of
persuasion and propaganda have been an omnipresent concern of society.
While this technology was in its infancy in the days of the five-and-ten-
cent theater, the first instance of censorship arose in Chicago in 1909.3
The initial challenge involved two films. One, The James Boys in
Missouri, was about the legendary James Gang. The other, Night Riders,
dealt with the tobacco war and depicted "malicious mischief, arson, and
murder." While the Illinois Supreme Court acknowledged that the films
illustrated "experiences connected with the history of the country," it
held that these films' portrayal of criminal activity was "immoral" and
"would necessarily be attended with evil effects upon youthful specta-
tors."39 On this basis, the court upheld an ordinance "prohibiting the
exhibition of obscene and immoral pictures and regulating the exhibition
of pictures of the classes and kinds commonly shown in mutoscopes,
kinescopes, cinematographs and penny arcades."'' 4 The court apparently
took judicial notice of the "evil effects" disseminated by this new me-
dium, without introduction of any supporting evidence. Judicial notice is
normally reserved for facts of common knowledge, or those which are
easily proved.4 Since these challenges involved a new medium, and no
cases preceded them, there seems to have been little justification for this
assumption.
The film Birth of a Nation, by master filmmaker D.W. Griffith, was
first shown at Clune's Auditorium in Los Angeles on February 8, 1915,
under the title The Clansman.42 This film, too, was quickly banned. The
37. Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230 (1915).
38. Block v. City of Chicago, 239 I11. 251, 87 N.E. 1011 (1909).
39. Id. at 264, 87 N.E. at 1016.
40. Id. at 256, 87 N.E. at 1012.
41. Harper v. Killion, 345 S.W.2d 309, 311 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961), stated, "The doctrine of
judicial notice is one of common sense. The theory is that, where a fact is well-known by all
reasonably intelligent people in the community, or its existence is so easily determinable with
certainty from unimpeachable sources, it would not be good sense to require formal proof."
See also Williams v. Commonwealth, 56 S.E.2d 537, 542-43 (1949). For additional discussion,
see Keeffe, Landis and Shaad, Sense and Nonsense About Judicial Notice, 2 STAN. L. REV. 664
(1950), and Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 HARV. L. REV. 269 (1944).
42. E. DEGRAZIA & R. NEWMAN, BANNED FILMS: MOVIES, CENSORS AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 3 (1982). The title under which this film opened was the name of a popular
novel by Thomas Dixon, Jr., which inspired much of Griffith's main story line. Both Griffith
and The Birth of a Nation have had a profound impact on contemporary filmmaking, and the
two are considered by today's practitioners to be the essence of artist and art. Despite this fact,
1986]
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plot dealt with the Civil War and Reconstruction. It depicted the Ku
Klux Klan as being central to the unification of the country during that
period of history. In Minnesota, the mayor of Minneapolis threatened to
revoke a theater's license if the movie was shown, and the owner sought
an injunction against such revocation. The city charter of Minneapolis,
however, provided that any license issued by the city council could be
revoked by the mayor or city council at any time. The state court held
that it had no reason "to doubt that the mayor, in proposing to revoke
the plaintiff's license if he persists in presenting this play, is acting in the
honest belief that such course is in the interest of public welfare and the
peace and good order of the city."43 The film was thus censored. This
question of law had yet to reach the United States Supreme Court.
Thomas Dixon, Jr., author of The Clansman, met with Supreme
Court Chief Justice White in 1915. Dixon persuaded the Court to see the
film, though the Chief Justice admitted to having never seen a movie."
Four days after viewing this film, the Supreme Court handed down a
unanimous decision in another motion picture case that crippled the film
industry for thirty-seven years.
In Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio,45 the
Supreme Court determined that motion pictures were excepted from first
amendment protection more than forty years before obscenity was de-
clared an exception to free speech.46 Acknowledging the viability of film
as a carrier of expression, the Court stated, "They indeed may be medi-
ums of thought, but so are many things. So is the theater, the circus, and
all other shows and spectacles. ... " The Court expressed its final as-
sessment as follows:
It cannot be put out of view that the exhibition of moving pic-
tures is a business, pure and simple, originated and conducted
for profit, like other spectacles, not to be regarded, nor intended
to be regarded by the Ohio Constitution, we think, as part of
the press of the country, or as organs of public opinion. They
are mere representations of events, of ideas and sentiments pub-
DeGrazia and Newman claim that it has been challenged in well over 100 incidents in and out
of court and, despite the Miller test, as recently as 1980.
43. Bainbridge v. City of Minneapolis, 131 Minn. 195, 154 N.W. 964 (1915).
44. DEGRAZIA & NEWMAN, supra note 42, at 4-5.
45. 236 U.S. 230 (1915).
46. Roth, 354 U.S. at 489.
47. Mutual Film, 236 U.S. at 243. It is interesting to note that because this was the first
Supreme Court decision confronting motion pictures, the Court described what a movie in-
volved. "The film consists of a series of instantaneous photographs or positive prints of action
upon the stage or in the open. By being projected upon a screen with great rapidity there
appears to the eye an illusion of motion." Id. at 232.
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lished and known; vivid, useful, and entertaining, no doubt,
but, as we have said, capable of evil, having power for it, the
greater because of their attractiveness and manner of exhibi-
tion. . . . We cannot regard this as beyond the power of
government.48
The key to the finding, therefore, was the commercial nature of
movies - that they were conducted solely to entertain, not to educate or
inform.49 Once again, a court found no problem with assuming facts not
in evidence about the psychological influence of movies. This decision
rang the death knell for motion pictures as a means of expressing contro-
versial ideas until 1952.50 In May of that year, salvation arrived in the
guise of Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson.51
Joseph Burstyn was the distributor of a film called The Miracle,
which was part of a trilogy entitled Ways of Love. Burstyn and his former
partner, Arthur L. Mayer, had made a name for themselves by importing
foreign films and stringing short artistic movies together into feature-
length showings under a single title, such as Ways of Love.12 Upon its
introduction in New York, the Legion of Decency attacked The Miracle
as "a sacrilegious and blasphemous mockery of Christian religious
48. Id. at 244-45 (emphasis added).
49. A substantial amount of comment and criticism has been generated as a consequence
of this case. Notable historical analyses appear in Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED
STATES (1941); M. ERNST, THE FIRST FREEDOM (1946); R. INGLIS, THE COMMISSION OF
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (1947); Kupferman and O'Brien, Motion Picture Censorship - The
Memphis Blues, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 73 (1951); Comment, Censorship of Motion Pictures, 49
YALE L.J. 87 (1939); Comment, Movie Censorship and the Supreme Court - What Next?, 42
CALIF. L. REV. 122 (1954); Note, Film Censorship: An Administrative Analysis, 39 COLUM. L.
REV. 1383 (1939); Note, Motion Pictures and the First Amendment, 60 YALE L.J. 696 (1951).
50. The courts during this period consistently followed the Mutual Film decision. See,
e.g., RD-DR Corp. v. Smith, 183 F.2d 562 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 853 (1950); Mutual
Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 244 F. 101 (7th Cir. 1915); Mutual Film Corp. v. Breitinger,
250 Pa. 225, 95 A. 433 (1915); Pathe Exch. v. Cobb, 202 A.D. 450, 195 N.Y.S. 661 (1922),
affd 236 N.Y. 539, 142 N.E. 274 (1923). It should be noted that Mutual Film arose ten years
prior to Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), which held that the first amendment applies
as a restraint on state action through the fourteenth amendment. Consequently, there was no
direct holding that films were not protected by the United States Constitution. See the com-
ment of Justice Douglas in United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166
(1948). It is similarly valuable to recognize the changes that occurred in the motion picture
medium during the several years following Mutual Film, and film's introduction as a news and
information carrier.
51. 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
52. DEGRAZIA & NEWMAN, supra note 42, at 77-79. This book provides a good back-
ground for the various films that have been subject to censorship over the years. The authors
trace 122 films that were banned between 1908 and 1981, providing the social and political
backdrops for each, as well as discussing the legal significance of each of these decisions.
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truth,"53 because the film resembled the biblical story of the Virgin Mary
and the birth of Christ. The conflict arose because The Miracle allegedly
ridiculed the Virgin Birth.54
The United States Supreme Court was presented with the question
of whether a New York statute could constitutionally ban a film on the
basis that it was "sacrilegious." 55 In its finding that the statute violated
first amendment guarantees, the court held:
It cannot be doubted that motion pictures are a significant me-
dium for the communication of ideas. . . The importance of
motion pictures as an organ of public opinion is not lessened by
the fact that they are designed to entertain as well as in-
form. . . . That books, newspapers, and magazines are pub-
lished and sold for profit does not prevent them from being a
form of expression whose liberty is safeguarded by the First
Amendment. We fail to see why operation for profit should
have any different effect in the case of motion pictures.56
It is at this point that the protection afforded other media of expres-
sion nearly merges with the new-found freedom of films. The commercial
nature of this variety of speech, highlighted in Mutual Film, was thus
rejected as a factor. Despite the seeming equivalence now enjoyed by
movies as a consequence of the Burstyn decision, the Supreme Court
sounded an alarm warning that all media are not created equal:
It does not follow that the Constitution requires absolute free-
dom to exhibit every motion picture of every kind at all times
and all places. That much is evident from the series of deci-
sions of this Court with respect to other media of communica-
tion of ideas. Nor does it follow that motion pictures are
necessarily subject to the precise rules governing any other partic-
ular method of expression. Each method tends to present its
own peculiar problems.57
53. Id. at 79.
54. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 303 N.Y. 242, 101 N.E.2d 665 (1951). It is interesting
to note that a film much like The Miracle is still the subject of great controversy today. Hail
Mary, a 1985 film by French director Jean-Luc Godard, depicts the Virgin Mary as a gas
station attendant whose language is somewhat less than pure. The film's highly vernacular
version of the Annunciation and the Virgin Birth prompted 5,000 demonstrators to line the
streets when the film opened at the New York Film Festival. In addition, at least one lay
group has protested to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights that the screening of Hail Mary
violated their religious rights. Schickel, Crying "Shame" at Lincohl Center, Time Magazine,
Oct. 21, 1985, at 81, col. 1.
55. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
56. Id. at 501-02.
57. Id. at 502-03 (emphasis added). See Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43
[Vol. 6
OBSCENITY AND FILM
This caveat, it so happens, was something of a prediction.
VISUAL AND VERBAL STANDARDS
The Supreme Court in Mutual Film58 was confronted with the issue
of film's viability as a medium of political and ideological exchange.59
Also at issue, and mentioned in that decision, was the efficacy of motion
pictures as a conduit for persuasion. The Court mentioned that this new
medium was "capable of evil, having the power for it, the greater because
of their attractiveness and manner of exhibition. . . . It was this capa-
bility and power, and it may be in experience of them, that induced the
state of Ohio . . . to require censorship before exhibition .. ."60 The
Court, in this discussion, attributed much influence and power to moving
pictures.6 Similar assumptions were echoed in many other decisions as
well.
Many years after Mutual Film, one legal commentator used this
same argument to support the position that it is the very power of film
that makes it a vital medium for transporting ideas and opinions.62 That
writer made the point as follows:
The significance of the motion picture as an organ of public
opinion is due not only to the nature of movie content but also
to the technological features of the medium. The addition of
speech to the screen since the date of the Mutual Film decision
has contributed to the effectiveness of movies as a communica-
tor of ideas. Dramatization through a unique combination of
sight and sound makes the ideas presented by movies compre-
hensible to more of the audience than is the case in any other
medium except television. Moreover, movies assure a high de-
(1961); Trans-Lux Distrib. Corp. v. Board of Regents, 14 N.Y.2d 88, 198 N.E.2d 242 (1964);
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); Landau v. Fording, 245 Cal. App. 2d 820, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 177 (1966), affid, 388 U.S. 456 (1967). Some of the cases cited by the Court in support
of this position regarding the limitations on other media include: Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S.
315 (1951); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568 (1942); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
58. Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230 (1915).
59. Id. at 243.
60. Id. at 244-45.
61. This opinion appears to associate an influence to films which would comport with
what communications researchers refer to as the "hypodermic-type" effect, which is the model
of a "manipulative media" that grew out of concerns over the use of such media during World
War I and World War II as a political propaganda instrument. See, e.g., Becker, McCombs
and McLeod, The Development of Political Cognitions, in POLITICAL COMMUNICATION: IS-
SUES AND STRATEGIES FOR RESEARCH 21 (S. Chaffee ed. 1975).
62. Note, Motion Pictures and the First Amendment, 60 YALE L.J. 696, 707 (1951).
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gree of attention and retention. The focusing of an intense light
on a screen, the dramatizing of fact and opinion, the semi-dark-
ness of the room where distracting ideas and suggestions are
eliminated all contribute to the effectiveness of movies in shap-
ing and changing attitudes.63
This comment, unlike the Court's conclusion in Mutual Film, is
supported by empirical research as evidence." The concern of the au-
thor is not the danger of abuse or misuse of such an effective means of
communication, but rather with its use as a legitimate channel of rapport
within the intent of the free speech promise explicit in the first
amendment.65
The statement of the Court in Mutual Film66 was made at a time
when the public was suspicious of the mass media and their effects in
general. At that time, mass media effects were assumed to be extremely
powerful. 67 However, by the time of Burstyn, in 1952, mass communica-
tion researchers had determined that such effects were probably not so
powerful, 6s but rather mass media had only "limited effects." ' 69 In spite
of this change in behavioral science theory, the Court in Burstyn did not
change its suspicious approach to film.
The Supreme Court continued to reflect earlier public opinion with-
63. Id. at 707-08.
64. Some major studies are referenced in this work, such as P. LAZARSFELD & P.
KENDALL, RADIO LISTENING IN AMERICA (1948); C. DAVY, FOOTNOTES TO THE FILM
(1937); E. LINDGREN, THE ART OF THE FILM (1948); Dale, Communication by Picture, CoM-
MUNICATIONS IN MODERN SOCIETY 72 (B. Schramm ed. 1948); J. KLAPPER, EFFECTS OF
MASS MEDIA (1950); L. DOOB, PROPAGANDA: ITS PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS TECHNIQUE (1935);
and H. BLUMER, MOVIES AND CONDUCT (1933).
65. Another author, in 1954, made essentially the same argument while acknowledging the
position alleged in Mutual Film. "[That m]ovies through their method of presentation do have
a strong impact on the attitudes and behavior of viewers is scarcely to be denied. . . .This has
resulted in many Americans feeling that movies must be subject to complete, even arbitrary,
control and regulation for the preservation of what are thought to be 'good' morals. However,
the other interest involved here has largely been ignored. This is the interest, on the one hand,
of movie producers making honest, realistic pictures that convey controversial, challenging
ideas, and the complementary interest of citizens to view these pictures, even at the risk of
having a prejudice or two shaken in the process." Comment, Movie Censorship and the
Supreme Court: What Next?, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 122, 128-29 (1954) (emphasis added).
66. Mutual Film, 266 U.S. at 244-45.
67. Becker, McCombs and McLeod, supra note 61.
68. See Star and Hughes, Report on an Educational Campaign: The Cincinnati Plan for the
United Nations, 55 AM. J. Soc. 389 (1950); Bauer, The Obstinate Audience, 19 AM. PSYCHOL-
OGIST 319 (1964).
69. Becker, McCombs and McLeod, supra note 61, at 21. See also M. MCCOMBS & L.
BECKER, USING MASS COMMUNICATION THEORY 41 (1979).
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out seeking empirical evidence to support its position. As the Court
observed:
[Motion pictures] may affect public attitudes and behavior in a
variety of ways, ranging from direct espousal of a political or
social doctrine to the subtle shaping of thought which charac-
terizes all artistic expression. . . . It is further urged that mo-
tion pictures possess a greater capacity for evil, particularly
among the youth of a community, than other modes of expres-
sion. . . . If there be capacity for evil it may be relevant in
determining the permissible scope of community control.7"
In 1961, the Supreme Court decided Times Film Corp. v. City of
Chicago.71 In that case, a distributor refused to submit a film, Don Juan,
for review by a Chicago city official in order to receive a license to exhibit
the film. The distributor filed suit seeking the license, claiming the proce-
dure requiring submission of the film constituted a prior restraint.72 The
result of this "broadside attack" was that, for the first time since its early
decision in Mutual Film, the Court specifically sustained the right of a
state to censor films without regard for the prohibition against prior
restraints.73
Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan dis-
sented. In an opinion written by the Chief Justice, they expressed con-
cern that the acquiesence to censorship could open a Pandora's Box:
[T]he decision presents a real danger of eventual censorship for
every form of communication, be it newspapers, journals,
70. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952). In 1959, the Supreme
Court again faced this issue in Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of New
York, 360 U.S. 684 (1958). A film distributor challenged the denial of a license to exhibit the
film Lady Chatterly's Lover. The distributor claimed the license was rejected on grounds that
certain scenes were "immoral," and this action denied the constitutional freedoms as an-
nounced in Burstyn. The Court found such a denial unconstitutional, since it was based upon
moral and religious precepts, thereby striking directly at the foundation of the first amend-
ment. In this way the Court effectively sidestepped the question of equal protection for the
various media. The finding addressed this issue tangentially. "Nor need we here determine
whether, despite problems peculiar to motion pictures, the control which a State may impose
upon this medium of expression are precisely co-extensive with those allowable for newspa-
pers, books, or individual speech. It is enough for the present case to reaffirm that motion
pictures are within the First and Fourteenth Amendments' basic protection." Kingsley, 360
U.S. at 689-90.
71. 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
72. Id. at 44.
73. One of the major protections afforded speech and the press is the prevention of prior
restraints. This is recounted by the Court in Burstyn, 343 U.S. 495, 506, noting that limita-
tions have been recognized only in exceptional cases. See also Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
697, 716 (1931).
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books, magazines, television, radio or public speeches. The
Court purports to leave these questions for another day, but I
am aware of no constitutional principle which permits us to hold
that the communication of ideas through one medium may be
censored while other media are immune. Of course each me-
dium presents its own peculiar problems, but they are not of the
kind which would authorize the censorship of one form of com-
munication and not others.
7 4
Four of the nine Justices disagreed with the decision on the basis
that such censorship boards would allow suppression to creep in with a
potential for spreading throughout other media of speech. While the dis-
sent was extensive, providing much insight into the majority opinion and
discussing the history of censorship in great detail, other comments in
the dissent are worthy of highlighting. The dissent alleged that the
Supreme Court had no factual basis for its finding that film had an im-
pact different from other modes of speech. Further, it implied that the
reason the Court did not provide reasoning in the opinion was this very
lack of factual evidence. Finally, the dissenters argued that even if such a
basis were available, it could not justify impressing upon the motion pic-
ture industry a greater level of suppression than that imposed on other
types of expression.75
The Times Film holding, that motion pictures can be censored,
stands in contrast to a later case involving book censorship. In Bantam
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,76 the Court struck down a statute creating a
"Commission to Encourage Morality in Youth" as being a form of un-
constitutional suppression of speech. One of the Commission's purposes
74. Times Film Corp., 365 U.S. at 51 (emphasis added). The opinion also noted, "It is not
to be disputed that this Court has stated that the protection afforded First Amendment liber-
ties from previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited. . . . But, licensing or censorship was
not, at any point, considered within the 'exceptional cases' discussed in the opinion in Near."
Id. at 53.
75. Id. at 76-77. "The Court, in no way, explains why moving pictures should be treated
differently than any other form of expression, why moving pictures should be denied the pro-
tection against censorship - 'a form of infringement upon freedom of expression to be espe-
cially condemned.' . . . The contention may be advanced that the impact of motion pictures is
such that a licensing system of prior censorship is permissible. . . . Although it is an open
question whether the impact of motion pictures is greater or less than that of other media, there
is not much doubt that the exposure of television far exceeds that of the motion picture. . ..
But, even if the impact of the motion picture is greater than that of some other media, that fact
constitutes no basis for the argument that motion pictures should be subject to greater suppres-
sion." Id. Justice Douglas, in a separate dissent, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Black,
further concluded, "The First Amendment was designed to enlarge, not to limit, freedom in
literature and in the arts as well as in politics, economics, law, and other fields." Id. at 84.
76. 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
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was to review books and to recommend prosecution in certain instances,
though it had no real powers of enforcement. Its practice was to notify a
distributor on Commission stationery that certain of its designated books
or magazines had been reviewed by the Commission and had been de-
clared objectionable."
The Supreme Court found that the Commission's practices, while
having no force of law and hence leaving a distributor free to ignore their
persistent notices, had the effect of intimidating a distributor into "volun-
tary" compliance. "People do not lightly disregard public officers' thinly
veiled threats to institute criminal proceedings against them if they do
not come around .. "78 In these circumstances, the Court found that
even an "intimidation," which might cause some to abstain from exercis-
ing their constitutional rights vis-a-vis the sale of books, was an unconsti-
tutional abomination; whereas Times Film, an outright censorship of
films, was accepted as being within the power of the State to protect its
citizens.
Another remark in the Bantam decision is interesting in light of
Times Film: "Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this
court with a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity ...
We have tolerated such a system only where it operated under judicial
superintendence and assured an almost immediate judicial determination
of the validity of the restraint."79 In Times Film, however, no mention
was made of "judicial superintendence" or "immediate judicial determi-
nation." Apparently, the Court did not even consider these questions,
despite the pervading tenor of the remark in Bantam. There were no
such mechanisms at issue in Times Film, in which the statute provided
that "[t]he action of the mayor on any application for a permit shall be
final."8° While the Court was very careful in applying a presumption of
invalidity in the case of books, it showed no such concern where film was
involved.
In Freedman v. Maryland,8 the conflicting principles from Times
Film82 and Bantam83 were confronted. In Freedman, the constitutional-
77. Id. at 61. Two of the books cited in this litigation as having been declared "objectiona-
ble" were Peyton Place, by Grace Metalious, and The Bramble Bush, by Charles Mergendahl.
Bantam, 372 U.S. at 62.
78. Id. at 68.
79. Id. at 70.
80. Times Film Corp., 365 U.S. at 45, n.2.
81. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
82. Id. at 53-54. The Court reaffirmed that censorship of motion pictures was not neces-
sarily unconstitutional.
83. Id. at 57. -[A]ny system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a
heavy presumption against its constitutional validity." Id.
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ity of a Maryland motion picture censorship statute was challenged. The
petitioner exhibited the film Revenge at Daybreak without first submit-
ting the picture to the State Board of Censors. The question raised by
the petitioner focused on the procedure of the censorship board, its lack
of judicial participation, and the time-consuming appeals procedure. The
Court distinguished Times Film, where the question was whether a par-
ticular censorship board violated its constitutional leeway. Conversely, in
Freedman, the question was "whether a prior restraint was necessarily
unconstitutional under all circumstances."4 Consequently, the Freed-
man court found that "[t]he Maryland statute lack[ed] sufficient safe-
guards for confining the censor's action to judicially determined
constitutional limits, and therefore contain[ed] the same vice as a statute
delegating excessive administrative discretion." 5
By integrating the procedural safeguards of Bantam with the prior
holding of Times Film, the Court signaled a narrowing of the gap be-
tween the first amendment protections afforded books and those afforded
film. Nonetheless, the Court continued to herald its belief that "films
differ from other forms of expression." 6 Although no evidence of differ-
ing psychological impact from one medium to the next was cited, this
proclamation was interpreted as a basis for allowing a different standard
to be applied to films.8 7
84. Id. at 53.
85. Id. at 57. Applying the rule recognized in its earlier decisions, the Court continued,
"[W]e hold that a noncriminal process which requires the prior submission of a film to a
censor avoids constitutional infirmity only if it takes place under procedural safeguards
designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship system. . . . [T]he burden of proving that the
film is unprotected expression must rest on the censor .. " Id. at 58.
86. Id. at 61. Justices Douglas and Black concurred with the decision in a separate, brief
opinion. They addressed this differentiation, stating, "[A] pictorial presentation occupies as
preferred a position as any other form of expression. If censors are banned from the publishing
business, from the pulpit, from the public platform - as they are - they should be banned
from the theatre." Id. at 62.
87. Landau v. Fording, 245 Cal. App. 2d 820, 54 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1966), makes the most
explicit explanation of this proposition. "[W]e think that the constitutional protection af-
forded does not mean that the visual impact of a motion picture as distinguished from other
media can be disregarded. Films are obviously different from other forms of expression
(Freedman v. State of Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 . . .). The significance of the motion picture
medium is due to the technological features of the particular medium. The unique combina-
tion of sight and sound that characterizes a motion picture makes the ideas presented by mov-
ies comprehensible to a larger audience than is the case in any other medium except
television. . . . Even in the absence of sound, movies assure a high degree of attention and
retention. The focusing of an intense light on a screen and the semi-darkness of the room
where distracting ideas and suggestions are eliminated contribute to the forcefulness of movies
and their unique effect on the audience. . . . Because of the nature of the medium, we think a
motion picture of sexual scenes may transcend the bounds of the constitutional guarantee long
before a frank description of the same scenes in the written word." Id. at 181 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 6
OBSCENITY AND FILM
Finally, in Kaplan v. California,88 the Supreme Court implicitly ac-
knowledged that film is subject to a lower standard of protection than
books:
Because of a profound commitment to protecting communica-
tion of ideas, any restraint on expression by way of the printed
word or in speech stimulates a traditional and emotional re-
sponse, unlike the response to obscene pictures of flagrant
human conduct. A book seems to have a different and preferred
place in our hierarchy of values, and so it should be.s9
This predominant judicial attitude indicates a bifurcated standard for
verbal and visual media, which is manifested procedurally in an acquies-
cence to prior restraint on motion pictures.
The question remains, do books really have a preferred place within
our value system? Do the "contemporary community standards" vary
from one medium to the next? Social scientists have dedicated their in-
terests, efforts, and resources to learning about human value systems.
This research can lend valuable counsel in assessing factual judgments
about the intangible human psyche.
APPLICATION OF EMPIRICISM
Prevalent in the cases discussed above are statements imputing qual-
ities to motion pictures for which the courts cite no factual basis support-
ing their findings. These discussions have erected segregated legal
constructs of regulable messages between visual and verbal methods of
intercourse. While it is arguable that no form of censorship is justified,9"
at the very least the standard applied should be consistent, irrespective of
medium,91 or a court should have some evidence upon which to base this
discriminatory analysis. This ideal, however, has not been adopted by
the courts.
The varieties of evidence typically admitted in obscenity cases in-
See also Trans-Lux Distrib. Corp. v. Board of Regents, 14 N.Y.2d 88, 92, 198 N.E.2d 242, 245
(1964); United States v. A Motion Picture Film Entitled "I Am Curious-Yellow", 404 F.2d
196, 198, 201 (2d Cir. 1968); P.B.I.C., Inc. v. Byrne, 313 F. Supp. 757, 763 (D. Mass. 1970).
88. 413 U.S. 115 (1973).
89. Id. at 119 (emphasis added).
90. See, e.g., concurring opinion of Justice Douglas in Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 431 (1966).
See also M. ERNST & W. SEAGLE, To THE PURE . . . A STUDY OF OBSCENIrY AND THE
CENSOR (1928).
91. This is in accord with the dissent of Chief Justice Warren in Times Film. 365 U.S. at
76-77.
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clude either lay testimony 92 or expert testimony.93 Unfortunately, the
former does little to add material evidence to the litigation. The fact that
a statute exists mandating such regulation, along with the institutional-
ized proceedings under that statute, establishes that some citizens find
certain material objectionable. Lay witnesses on the side of the prosecu-
tion are simply examples of that segment of the population.
The purpose of lay testimony is obviously an attempt to establish the
"contemporary community standard" under the Miller test.94 However,
students of behavioral science know that such witnesses, unless chosen
through random sampling, are quite unlikely to approximate representa-
tion of the community at large.95 Simply stated, such testimony is at best
minimally probative and at worst misleading to the jury. There is a seri-
ous danger that the members of the jury might impart greater probative
value to such testimony than it can reasonably be accorded, not being
educated in scientific research methodology. When each party presents
such lay witnesses, with the same number on each side to balance the
unrepresentative sampling, such testimony becomes nothing but an eco-
nomic burden to the parties involved since it will likely have a null effect.
Experts, on the other hand, can play a useful function in obscenity
cases, including expressing the psychological distinction between visual
and verbal forms of expression. However, courts rarely receive more than
the unbridled opinion of "experts" in the field of arts, literature, science,
or religion.96 Experts have not been used to teach the factfinder about
the respective fields so that an informed opinion can be rendered. The
92. See, e.g., United States v. 4200 Copies Int'l Journal, 134 F. Supp. 490, 493 (E.D.
Wash. 1955); United States v. Klaw, 350 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1965).
93. For a complete discussion of the function of experts in obscenity litigation, see Bates,
Pornography and the Expert Witness, 20 CRIM. L.Q. 250 (1978); Frank, Obscenity: Some
Problems of Values and the Use of Experts, 41 WASH. L. REV. 631, 633 (1966); Ladd, Expert
Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414 (1952); Lamont, Public Opinion Polls and Survey Evidence in
Obscenity Cases, 15 CRIM. L.Q. 135 (1972-73); McGaffney, A Realistic Look at Expert Wit-
nesses in Obscenity Cases, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 218 (1974); Stern, Toward a Rationalefor the Use
of Expert Testimony in Obscenity Litigation, 20 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 527 (1969); Comment,
Expert Testimony in Obscenity Cases, 18 HAST. L.J. 161 (1966).
94. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 21-22. The applicable portion of the standard being
"whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that
the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest."
95. See L. KISH, SURVEY SAMPLING (1965); E. BABBLE, SURVEY RESEARCH METHODS
(1973).
96. See, e.g., United States v. A Motion Picture Film Entitled "I Am Curious-Yellow".
404 F.2d 196, 198, 201 (2d Cir. 1968) (which paraded thirteen "experts" across the stand.
including professional critics, English professors, a minister, sociology professors, a "'professor
of film," psychiatrists, and a novelist); Landau v. Fording, 245 Cal. App. 2d 820, 54 Cal. Rptr.
177 (1966) (involving eight "experts").
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Supreme Court, in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,9 7 observed in a
footnote:
[Obscenity] is not a subject that lends itself to the traditional
use of expert testimony. Such testimony is usually admitted for
the purpose of explaining to lay jurors what they otherwise
could not understand. No such assistance is needed by jurors
in obscenity cases; indeed, the "expert witness" practices em-
ployed in these cases have often made a mockery out of the
otherwise sound concept of expert testimony.98
The Court acknowledged the intent of expert testimony, but went
on, ironically, to conclude that it was not necessary in this situtation
because "hard core pornography . . . can and does speak for itself."9 9
This conclusion is not explained. It is difficult to conceive of how por-
nography can "speak for itself' when determining all of the components
of the Miller test,1°° such as deciding what the "contemporary commu-
nity standard" might be. Experts can, however, be instrumental in deter-
mining such facts, as well as answering questions about the impact a
visual or verbal work has on the "average person."
Another use of experts, rather than to have them testify as to their
bare opinions,"°' is to have them gather and present empirical evidence.
Evidence can be collected through accepted social science research tech-
niques, such as sample surveys and controlled experiments. These meth-
ods could be employed to answer such factual questions as: 1) What are
the standards of this community?; 2) Does this work appeal to the pruri-
ent interest of the average person?; and 3) Do visual works have a greater
impact on the average person than verbal works? In a concurring opin-
ion in Smith v. California, 10 2 Justice Frankfurter noted that "community
standards or the psychological or physiological consequences of ques-
tioned literature can as a matter of fact hardly be established except
through experts."'
10 3
97. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
98. Id. at 56, n.6.
99. Id.
100. Miller, 413 U.S. at 21-22.
101. Hewitt v. Maryland State Bd. of Censors, 254 A.2d 203 (Md. 1969), received the testi-
mony of a psychiatrist, Dr. Robert M. Vidaver, which was composed of such bare opinions as,
"I do feel that the appeal was very cleverly used to stimulate not so much the normal sexual
drive of heterosexual relations and sexual intercourse, but a variety of perverted and infantile
sexual themes." Id. at 206. The court appeared to place great probative value on this testi-
mony and even stated, "Dr. Vidaver's qualifications as an expert witness are impressive." Id.
at 205.
102. 361 U.S. 147, 160 (1959).
103. Id. at 165.
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The Court of Appeal for Manitoba, Canada, in R. v. Prairie
Schooner News Ltd. and Powers,'°4 made the following observation:
[W]hen it becomes necessary to determine the true nature of
community standards and to find a single normative standard,
the Court should not be denied the benefit of evidence, scientifi-
cally obtained in accordance with accepted sampling proce-
dure, by those who are expert in the field of opinion
research. . . . The state of mind of a community is as much a
fact as the state of one's health.' °5
The courts have not been quick to require such an evidentiary basis
for these factual questions. The Supreme Court in Kaplan v. Califor-
nia"' considered the question of whether a state should be able to regu-
late obscenity without proof that it is harmful. The Court's convictions
were expressed as follows:
States need not wait until behavioral experts or educators can
provide empirical data before enacting controls of commerce in
obscene materials unprotected by the First Amendment or by a
constitutional right to privacy. We have noted the power of a
legislative body to enact such regulatory laws on the basis of
unprovable assumptions.'07
The point of empirical research is, however, that such facts are not
unprovable. Survey research is not a perfect science, but its accuracy
over the last forty years has become increasingly reliable, and it has cer-
tainly attained sufficient precision for serious consideration by the
courts. 108 While it may have been necessary in the distant past to make
assumptions, the state of the art is now such that the courts can no
longer claim ignorance as justification for imposing their own biases.
The bipartite approach to visual and verbal pornography is this sort of
unjustifiable assumption.
In partial defense of the courts, no truly comparative studies of vis-
ual and verbal pornographic stimuli have been published. In the absence
of such evidence, there appears to be no basis upon which to hold that a
difference in relative effects is indeed a fact. On the contrary, if the par-
104. [1970], 75 W.W.R. 585, 12 CRIM. L.Q. 462, 1 C.C.C.(2d) 251, (Man.C.A.) (Dickson,
J.A. concurring opinion).
105. Id. at 593, 12 CRIM. L.Q. at 477, 1 C.C.C.(2d) at 266.
106. 413 U.S. 115 (1973).
107. Id. at 120 (emphasis added).
108. The Gallup Poll, in the 1984 presidential election, predicted precisely the outcome of
the election and the other major polls were within about three percent. Such factors as the
level of confidence can be presented and explained to the factfinder so that the margins of error
can be considered in assessing the probative value of the evidence.
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ties wish to argue that there is a difference between books and film, re-
search should be commissioned by the asserting party.
One substantial problem with a Brandeis Brief1"9 approach to this
issue is that other policy questions might require reevaluation in light of
this new evidence. In fact, the entire Miller definition of obscenity, or
even the very foundation of public policy on which this regulation is con-
structed, may be shaken. Empirical implications of the various impacts
of obscenity, irrespective of sensory mode, could challenge our historical
bases for excepting various manners of speech from the purview of the
first amendment.
THE DANGERS OF EMPIRICISM
Research on pornography has already tendered some insights into
the effects of obscenity that were heretofore outside mere common sense.
In 1970, for example, the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography,
appointed by President Johnson, published a report summarizing scien-
tific studies conducted between 1968 and 1970.10 The Commission ex-
amined the effects of a variety of sexually explicit materials, and
determined that they were neither harmful to individuals nor society, and
in fact could be educational."'
As a result of this and other studies," 2 two schools of thought have
emerged regarding the psychological repercussions of obscene materials.
The first of these schools, and one which harmonizes with the apparent
attitudes of the courts, is a behaviorist theory. This construct purports
that sex roles are learned behavior, and that exposure to pornography
teaches anti-social activity and, hence, attitudes. The other position
takes a psychoanalytic stance, suggesting that this material can help peo-
ple to resolve inner conflicts and rechannel their inherent aggressions.' 3
In 1977, two researchers, Dolf Zillman and Barry S. Sapolsky, at-
tempted to discover the consequence of exposure to pornography on
109. In 1908, Louis D. Brandeis, later to become a Justice of the Supreme Court, success-
fully defended an Oregon law establishing a ten-hour workday for women with a maneuver
that many have heralded as the precursor to the use of social scientific evidence in court. The
so-called "Brandeis Brief' consisted of only two pages of legal argument and more than 100
pages of social scientific evidence involving primarily labor statistics. See Muller v. Oregon,
208 U.S. 412 (1908).
110. COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY, THE REPORT OF THE COMMIS-
SION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY (1970).
111. Id. at 27.
112. See, e.g., M.J. GOLDSTEIN, PORNOGRAPHY AND SEXUAL DEVIANCE (1974).
113. For a discussion of these two philosophies, see English, The Politics of Porn, 5
MOTHER JONES 44 (April 1980).
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male college students. They began by angering the men and then expos-
ing them either to neutral photographs, soft-core pornography, or hard-
core pornography. Their findings suggested that both the soft-core and
hard-core pornography tended to defuse the anger of these subjects.'
14
That result comports with research conducted by Robert A. Baron and
Paul A. Bell at about the same time."1 5 This is not to suggest, however,
that all of the evidence supports the diffusion-of-anger theory. Several
studies have shown that previously angered men can show increased ag-
gressive tendencies following exposure to hard-core pornography, but
that non-angered men display no such increase. 116 While the evidence is
far from conclusive that the presumption of harmful effects from obscene
materials is wrong, it does indicate that such impacts are not as clear a
fact as common sense might lead the courts to believe.
A possibility is presented in these studies, though yet unresolved,
that obscenity may have social value under the Memoirs standard1 17 by
assisting viewers to alleviate hostilities. The studies suggest both that
visual obscenity might not be "capable of evil,"'11 and that neither visual
nor verbal obscenity is harmful - the comparative powers of these two
modes of expression, as a consequence, fading into immateriality.
A further possible outcome of turning to the social sciences for be-
havioral evidence could be the realization that it is some variable often
(but not necessarily) associated with obscenity that is the purveyor of
detrimental effects. A serious criticism of the report of the Commission
on Obscenity and Pornography 1 9 is its failure to separate depictions of
nudity and intercourse from those portraying violence related to sex.' E°
The salient issue may, therefore, be violence. The well-known feminist,
Gloria Steinem, has argued that it is not sexual activity which constitutes
114. Zillman and Sapolsky, What Mediates the Effect of Mild Erotica on Annoyance and
Hostile Behavior in Males?, 35 J. OF PERS. AND SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 587 (1977).
115. Baron and Bell, Sexual Arousal and Aggression by Males. Effects of Type of Erotic
Stimuli and Prior Provocation, 35 J. OF PERS. AND SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 79 (1977). For a more
recent study, which finds a differing response to mild versus strongly erotic stimuli, see Rami-
rez, Zillman, and Bryant, Effects of Erotic Retaliatory Behavior as a Function of Level of Prior
Provocation, 43 J. OF PERS. AND SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 971 (1982).
116. Donnerstein, Donnerstein, and Evans, Erotic Stimuli and Aggression: Facilitation or
Inhibition?, 32 J. OF PERS. AND SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 237 (1975).
117. This is an example of "redeeming social value" that may not qualify under the stricter
Miller "literary, artistic, political, or scientific value" standard.
118. Mutual Film, 236 U.S. at 244-45.
119. COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 110.
120. This weakness has been noted by several researchers, and is discussed in Vivar, The
New Anti-Female Violent Pornography. Is Moral Condemnation the Only Justifiable Response?,
7 LAW AND PSYCH. REv. 53, 58 (Spring 1982). See also Zillman and Bryant, Pornography.
Sexual Callousness, and the Trivialization of Rape, 32(4) J. OF COMM. 10, 11 (Fall 1982).
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pornography, but rather "violence, dominance, and conquest."'' In
studies unrelated to obscenity, the viewing of violence on television has
been found to be strongly related to violent action. In a review of this
research, L. Rowell Huesman, at the University of Illinois at Chicago
Circle, found that "[v]iolence viewing and aggressive behavior clearly are
positively related, not just in our culture, but in other western cultures as
well." '122 It could be that rather than regulating "dirty" pictures and
stories, the courts would more profitably spend their efforts placing
boundaries around the communication of violence.
The reticence of judges to deny their common sense may be under-
standable, but there is much to be learned from behavioral research.
There is a whole world of knowledge outside the traditional training and
expertise of legal practitioners with implications that touch the very cor-
nerstone of many legal premises. The judiciary must begin to pay due
notice to the discoveries of these specialists, and to integrate these factual
revelations and their incumbent policy considerations into the advocacy
process, to construct a stronger and more viable system of jurisprudence.
The law is necessarily social in nature, since it is aimed at regulating
human behavior and revolves around public perceptions of right and
wrong. To determine facts such as the contemporary community stan-
dards and whether a separate community standard adheres depending on
the mode of expression, the courts now have the tool of empirical behav-
ioral research at their disposal.
SUMMARY
As the Supreme Court explained in invalidating a movie licensing
statute, "[T]he First Amendment's basic guarantee is of freedom to advo-
cate ideas. The State, quite simply, has thus struck at the very heart of
constitutionally protected liberty." '123 In Cohen v. California,124 the
Court further described these basic guarantees:
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine
in a society as diverse and populous as ours. It is designed and
intended to remove governmental restraints from the arena of
public discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be
121. Steinem, Erotica and Pornography: A Clear and Present Difference, in TAKE BACK THE
NIGHT: WOMEN AND PORNOGRAPHY (L. Lederer ed. 1980).
122. Huesmann, Television Violence and Aggressive Behavior, in TELEVISION AND BEHAV-
IOR (NIMH) (1982).
123. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of New York, 360 U.S. 684, 688
(1959).
124. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
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voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use
of such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citi-
zenry and more perfect polity and in the belief that no other
approach would comport with the premise of individual dignity
and choice upon which our political system rests.
125
This right of free expression is a grave and ominous responsibility
which is pivotal to all other freedoms. It is a responsibility not taken
lightly by the courts. Nonetheless, the courts appear hesitant to supplant
traditional beliefs with scientific methodology when balancing this right
against other seemingly conflicting rights. This cloud of suspicion and,
perhaps, reluctance to forfeit some of their control, has resulted in the
courts creating a separate standard for visual obscenity than the one it
imposes on its verbal counterpart. Social science offers the tools to rec-
tify this inequity, and it has reached such proficiency that it is now an
appropriate technology to be used in circumventing the traditional "un-
provable assumption" necessitated in the past. This is not to suggest that
behavioral research is a fully matured science capable of a definitive an-
swer to this dilemma, but merely that it has greater probative value than
the alternative: the naked opinion of a judge. As Justice Black argued:
So far as I know, judges possess no special expertise providing
exceptional competency to set standards and to supervise the
private morals of the Nation. 1
26
125. Id. at 24.
126. Kingsley, 360 U.S. at 690 (Black, J., concurring opinion).
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